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It is a sad thing when high-level American and Iranian officials make contradictory claims and the Iranians turn out to be right. This has happened a few times since the war began almost six weeks ago. In the latest instance, U.S. officials said the two sides were very close to agreement on a peace deal; the Iranians denied that assessment, and indeed, at least so far, no deal has been struck.
The continued impasse was predictable. President Donald Trump appears all too desperate for an end to the war. The commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, the elite military unit now running Iran, are in no hurry, having survived a massive U.S.–Israeli bombing campaign and in fact emerging in some ways more powerful than before.
At this point, the competition is over which side can outlast the other’s suffering—Trump (whose popularity is tanking amid the high gas prices resulting from Iran’s chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz) or the Iranians (whose population is suffering from the bombing’s devastation and the subsequent U.S. blockade). The Iranian officers—who feel little if any pressure from the population, having killed thousands of protesters just before the war began—believe they have the edge. According to the Washington Post, a report by the CIA, classified confidential, agrees.
This self-confidence, which seems justified, is reinforced by Trump’s continued wavering. Several times, he has promised to resume the strikes, even threatening to bomb Iran “back to the stone age,” then backpedaled. He and his top aides declared Operation Epic Fury (as he named the war) to be over and won, even though none of his stated goals have been achieved. Then he announced a new phase, Project Freedom, in which U.S. warships would escort oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, only to call it off after less than two days. He said he had suspended the project because of major progress in peace talks mediated by Pakistan—but according to several news reports, the real reason was that the Saudis told him they would block the U.S. military from using their bases or airspace if he continued with the operation.
Now Trump is saying he will resume the bombing if Iran doesn’t accept a proposed 14-point peace plan as the basis for negotiations, to be held over a 30-day period. There is no reason why the Iranian officers should take his offer or his threat at all seriously.
It was the mere presentation of the plan that prompted White House officials to declare that the two sides are close to making a peace deal. A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry waved away the optimism, describing the new 14 points as a “list of American wishes.”
Late Thursday afternoon, Iranian officials said they were discussing the proposal. At least, then, they haven’t rejected it outright, but nor have they accepted it. A fair bet might be that they’ll accept it as the basis of negotiations, then stretch the talks out for as long as possible, all while continuing to control the strait and to enjoy the cessation of bombing.
One source of influence here may be China, whose leaders have encouraged them to continue negotiating with the Americans. China has some leverage here, as Iran’s most generous and powerful ally, accounting for more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports. However, by the same token, China somewhat depends on the strait’s stability too. For that reason, Iran’s officers may feel no compulsion to kowtow to Beijing.
In any case, the Chinese, who no doubt enjoy seeing the United States bogged down in the Middle East, aren’t pressuring their Iranian friends too intensely. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, told his Iranian counterpart that the “international community shares a common concern for restoring normal, safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz, and that therefore “sticking to negotiations” toward a “comprehensive cessation of hostilities” is “particularly important.”
However, Wang added, “China supports Iran’s efforts to safeguard its national sovereignty and security,” including its right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
This is where Trump faces a personal and political dilemma. In talks with Iran, which his emissaries held for a few weeks before he launched his surprise attack on Feb. 28, the president insisted that any deal must ban Iran from enriching uranium to any degree. Iran rejected that demand, citing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which grants its signatories the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Like all but a few of the world’s nations, Iran signed the NPT.)
Trump’s insistence on zero enrichment blocked what could have been a settlement of the conflict before the bombing began. In those prewar talks, Iran offered to dispose of its highly enriched uranium (which is nearing the level necessary for an atomic weapon) and to limit further enrichment to a purity level of 1.5 percent—nowhere near enough to build a weapon. (Weapons-grade uranium must be 90 percent pure; the nation currently has about 1,000 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent.) Trump rejected the offer.
Since the ceasefire, Iranians have gone further, offering to stop all enrichment for five years and to readmit international inspectors to verify compliance. (These inspectors were granted such access after signing the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by President Barack Obama and other leaders, but they were closed out—and Iran rebuilt its facilities, enriching more uranium than ever before—after Trump scuttled the deal during his first term as president.)
This was an extraordinary concession. Trump could have accepted it and claimed that his Iran nuclear deal was better than Obama’s, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium at a level of 3.67 percent. But he rejected the offer, demanding a 20-year suspension—a term Iran was certain to reject.
It is unclear why the president has insisted on an enrichment ban. Does he believe that letting Iran enrich even a little bit, and even under international inspection, would inevitably lead to an Iranian A-bomb—despite experts’ analyses to the contrary? Or does he fear that allowing any enrichment—especially after decrying it for so long—will make his Iran nuclear deal look too much like Obama’s nuclear deal, which Trump has called “the worst deal” in American history?
Trump may now be facing this dilemma: reject another opportunity for a peace of sorts with Iran and a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—or accept it but risk comparisons to Obama, the object of his dread.
The offer put on the table by Trump’s envoys—his son-in-law Jared Kushner and fellow real-estate broker Steve Witkoff—is a one-page “memorandum of understanding,” laying out 14 points to negotiate over a 30-day period. Some of those points pose an uncanny resemblance to Obama’s deal.
According to an exclusive report by Axios, the points include:
An end to America’s blockade of Iran, and Iran’s opening of the Strait of Hormuz;
An Iranian moratorium on enriched uranium, after which enrichment would be limited to 3.67 percent, with intensive inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
An Iranian commitment to export its highly enriched uranium to another country, possibly the U.S.;
The U.S. lifts economic sanctions against Iran and releases billions of dollars in Iranian funds that had been frozen under sanctions.
One wonders, has Trump seen this memorandum? Did he authorize Kushner and Witkoff to put it on the table as the basis for talks? The limit on enrichment—3.67 percent—is exactly how much Obama’s deal allowed. The lifting of sanctions was a crucial ingredient of Obama’s deal. And the unfreezing of billions of dollars is the part of Obama’s deal that especially aroused Trump’s ire. (He has inaccurately characterized it, many times, as a cash giveaway.)
In April, the Iranians proposed a 10-point peace plan, which Trump took as the basis for negotiations—and as an excuse to declare a ceasefire. Many of those points went way beyond what any American president would have accepted as actual peace planks—including the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from the Middle East and the enshrinement of unlimited uranium enrichment for Iran.
Will Iran reassert those demands in a counteroffer? Or is there a chance that the Kushner-Witkoff plan actually leads to some sort of peace? The reprise of Obama’s deal would be a welcome development, but it was very complicated; the document was 159 pages, was highly detailed, and took 20 months to negotiate. Trump lacks not only the patience for this sort of thing but also the staff to endure and execute it. There used to be a lot of experts at the State Department, the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence agencies to hammer out the fine points of such a deal, but many of them have departed, and those who have remained are rarely if ever consulted.
What will it be, then—a prolonged state of war, Iran’s surrender to Trump, or Trump’s capitulation to Obama? The future seems flush with surprise and discomfort.
